The government of the recipient country.
Recipient governments first attempt to remain in power by targeting resources to constituents.

  • Traditionally, one challenge for donor organizations has been to evaluate whether governments or other state agencies in recipient countries have been using aid funds for their own special interests or for those of their specific clientele instead of deploying these funds in the collective interests of their society.
  • A sufficient level of “good” governance in a recipient country is therefore a necessary, though by no means sufficient, criterion for aid effectiveness.
  • Fragmented donor structures and the planning- and control-intensive implementation of a large number of individual projects contributed to the emergence of fragmented and overstrained institutional structures in recipient countries
  • Macro programs driven by multilateral donors do not respond to systemic challenges posed by developing countries, they accord only limited importance to country-specific social and political actor constellations and interest structures, and they do not respond to the country-specific political economy of policy transformation.
  • The large number of donor agencies makes it easier for reform-averse governments to play donors off against one another.
  • “Aid flows and the mechanisms donors adopt to track and monitor them, are very intensive in terms of recipient capacity (high transaction cost). Each donor agency has its own reporting system. In a typical African country, there can be upwards of 20 aid agencies from different countries and multilateral agencies. The hard-pressed civil servants spend much of their time managing the paper flow. At the political level, ministers have to spend a considerable amount of time in turn meeting with donor delegations.” (Kanbur 2003)
  • (Recent) political changes at the international level as well as in many developing countries have increased incentives for recipient and donor governments alike to increase their responsiveness toward the interests of taxpayers and needy target groups as the ultimate principals of development cooperation.
  • The management capacities of recipient governments for instance as regards knowledge concerning both effective and less successful DC interventions are hindered by a lack of truly independent, transparent, and comparable evaluation methods.

Source: Jörg Faust, Dirk Messner (2007) Organizational Challenges for an Effective Aid Architecture – Traditional Deficits, the Paris Agenda and Beyond.


The Fringes

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